期刊文献+

企业财务造假与监管的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Corporate Financial Fraud and Supervision
下载PDF
导出
摘要 以博弈理论为基础建立企业财务造假与监管部门的一般策略模型,对国内企业财务造假问题产生的原因进行分析;建立增加对监管部门的奖励机制后企业与监管部门的博弈模型,进而提出减缓企业财务造假现象的意见建议。最终得出的结论是:应把重点放在监督管理上;对监管部门增加奖励机制是有效的。 Based on game theory,the general strategy model of enterprise financial fraud and supervision department is established,and the causes of domestic enterprise financial fraud are analyzed.The game model between enterprise and supervision department is established after increasing the reward mechanism of supervision department,and the suggestions to slow down the phenomenon of enterprise financial fraud are put forward.The final conclusion is that the focus should be on supervision and management,and it is effective to increase the incentive mechanism for regulators.
作者 杨明 YANG Ming(School of Economics and Management,Lanzhou Jiaotong University,Lanzhou 730000,China)
出处 《经济研究导刊》 2020年第32期113-114,153,共3页 Economic Research Guide
关键词 财务造假 监管 博弈 奖励机制 financial fraud regulation game reward mechanism
  • 相关文献

参考文献3

二级参考文献16

共引文献16

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部