集体经营性建设用地:入市与地方政府行为

Rural Collective Commercial Construction Land:Market Entry and Local Government Behavior

集体经营性建设用地入市能否顺利推进,能否达到预期的目的,地方政府的行为和选择是其中一个重要影响因素。通过构建数理模型对地方政府的行为和选择进行分析,得到如下发现:地方政府对入市集体经营性建设用地数量和用途的控制降低了农民的土地出让收益,减少了城市土地供给,减缓了中国的城市化进程,损害了土地资源配置效率和市场公平;由于地方政府的消极应对和变通,目前集体经营性建设用地入市还没有真正起到增加城市土地出让市场竞争,增加土地供给,提高被征地农民补偿的作用;集体经营性建设用地入市会减少地方政府土地征收数量和收益,地方政府迫于中央政府的要求和地方政府间竞争压力会允许一部分土地入市;地方政府允许入市的土地数量与土地征收成本、土地增值收益调节金征收比例、中央政府的压力、地方政府间竞争压力正相关,与城市土地价格负相关;由于受到中央对土地增值收益调节金征收最高比例的限制,地方政府更愿意让土地以工业用途入市,不愿意以商住用途入市;对位于城区的集体经营性建设用地,地方政府也可以采取多种方式来规避入市土地对城市商住土地市场的影响。

The behavior and choice of the local government is one of the important factors that affect the smooth progress of rural collective commercial construction land entering the market and whether it can achieve the expected goal.Through the analysis of the behavior and choice of the local government by building a mathematical model,the following findings are obtained:the local government’s control of the number and use of rural collective commercial construction land into the market reduces the farmers’land transfer income,reduces the urban land supply,slows down the process of China’s urbanization,and damages the efficiency of land resource allocation and market equity;due to the negative response of the local government at present,the entry of rural collective commercial construction land into the market has not really played a role in increasing the market competition of urban land transfer,increasing land supply and improving the compensation of land expropriated farmers;the entry of rural collective commercial construction land into the market will reduce the amount and income of land acquisition by local governments,and local governments will allow part of the land under the requirements of the central government and the pressure of competition among local governments;the amount of land allowed to enter the market by the local government is positively correlated with the cost of land acquisition,the proportion of land value-added income adjustment fee,the pressure of the central government and the pressure of competition among local governments,but negatively related to the price of urban land;due to the restriction of the highest proportion of land value-added income adjustment fees collected by the central government,local governments are more willing to allow land to enter the market for industrial use,rather than for commercial and residential purposes;for the collectively operated construction land located in urban areas,local governments can also take various ways to avoid the impact of land entering the market on urban commercial and residential land market.