摘要
在选择最适合自身需求的审计师方面,企业会关注竞争对手的选择,并在享受审计专家服务与保护专有信息外溢之间寻求平衡。以企业的收入排名和经营范围的相似度衡量竞争对手,检验竞争对手间的审计师共享行为。研究发现,当行业内经营范围高度相似的两个企业互为竞争对手时,共享审计师的可能性较低;行业竞争激烈程度会放大竞争对手共享审计师的负向关系;但当外部审计师为审计专家时,会改变同行竞争对手不愿共享审计师的倾向;从经济后果来看,聘用同一会计师事务所的同行企业会有相似的经济决策。从财务层面构建衡量竞争对手的方法,验证竞争对手间的共享审计师问题,发现审计师不仅是财务报表的鉴证者,也是知识与资源丰富的信息中介与来源。
In selecting the auditors most suitable for their needs,a firm will focus on the choice of the competitors and seek a trade-off between the benefit of audit expertise and the protection of the proprietary information spillovers.This paper uses sales ranking and the similarity of business scope to measure industry rivals,and examines the auditor sharing behavior among close competitors.It finds that rival firms are reluctant to engage the same auditor when their business scope is more similar,and this negative relation is greater when the rival firms operate in a highly competitive industry.If an external auditor is an expert,it will change the tendency of competitors not willing to share auditors.In terms of economic consequences,peer firms sharing the same auditor have a similar economic decision.This research constructs a method to measure the competitors from the financial perspective,validates the problem of sharing auditors among competitors,and finds that auditors are not only the assurance providers,but also the information intermediaries and rich information sources.
作者
陈丽英
李婉丽
CHEN Liying;LI Wanli(School of Accounting, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai 201620, China)
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第6期41-50,共10页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金(18BJY235)
上海市哲学社会科学规划项目(2016EGL003)。
关键词
竞争对手
共享审计师
经营范围相似度
审计专家
专有信息外溢
competitors
shared auditors
business scope similarity
audit experts
proprietary information spillovers