摘要
为了充分考虑需求响应对发电机组竞价策略的影响,提出了一种计及需求侧竞价的非合作信息完全环境下的发电机组竞价模型,考虑了自身成本、对方的报价行为、需求侧用户的报价行为及电网运行等限制约束。上层模型描述了在发电商非合作信息完全博弈环境下的收益,下层模型描述了不计入网损安全约束经济调度出清。并同时提出了一种基于混合混沌萤火虫-粒子群算法的博弈理论方法求解该双层模型,用于提高算法的收敛性能及更好地反映发电商的报价行为。最后,采用标准IEEE30节点系统验证了所提算法在求解计及需求侧竞价的发电侧策略双层模型时的优越性,为计及需求侧竞价的发电机组竞价方法提供验证。
In order to fully consider the influence of demand response upon generating unit bidding strategy,a generating unit bidding model in the environment of complete non-cooperative information taking into account demand-side bidding was proposed in this paper,under consideration of such constraints as its own cost,counterparty's bidding behavior,demand-side user's bidding behavior as well as grid operation.The upper model described the revenues in the game environment of complete non-cooperative information of power generators,while the lower model described economic dispatch and clearing without considering network loss security constraint.In the meanwhile,a game theory approach based on hybrid chaotic firefly-particle swarm algorithm was proposed to solve the two-layer model so as to improve the convergence performance of the algorithm and reflect the bidding behavior of power generators in a better way.Finally,the IEEE30 node system was adopted to verify the superiority of the proposed algorithm in solving the double-layer model of the generation-side strategy considering demand-side bidding and to provide verification for the bidding method of generating units considering demand-side bidding.
作者
张翔
陈政
尚楠
张元
易江文
Zhang Xiang;Chen Zheng;Shang Nan;Zhang Yuan;Yi Jiangwen(China Southern Grid Energy Development Research Institute, Guangzhou Guangdong 510663, China;Tsinghua Sichuan Energy Internet Research Institute, Chengdu Sichuan 610000, China)
出处
《电气自动化》
2020年第6期59-61,105,共4页
Electrical Automation
基金
中国南方电网有限责任公司科技项目(编号:ZBKJXM20180373)。
关键词
计及需求侧竞价
纳什均衡
混合混沌萤火虫-粒子群算法
进化博弈理论
机组竞价
considering demand-side bidding
Nash equilibrium
hybrid chaotic firefly-particle swarm algorithm
evolutionary game theory
generating unit bidding