行业参照视角下高管薪酬黏性成因研究

Research on the Cause of Executive Compensation Stickiness from the Perspective of Industry Reference

文章在契约制定层面,基于行业参照视角探究高管薪酬黏性成因。通过扩展的委托代理模型进行数理分析,并以2014-2018年沪深A股上市公司为对象进行实证检验,得出以下结论:(1)高管薪酬存在黏性特征;(2)高管薪酬契约制定兼具绩效导向属性和行业参照特征;(3)高管薪酬黏性成因之一在于:绩效下降时,高管薪酬行业参照特征增强,同时绩效导向属性减弱,促使薪酬绩效敏感性较绩效上升时明显减弱,产生薪酬黏性。

At the level of contract making,this paper explores the causes of executive compensation stickiness from the perspective of industry reference.Through the mathematical analysis of the extended principal-agent model and the empirical test of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)There is stickiness in executive compensation;(2)Executive compensation contract has the characteristics of both performanceorientation and industry reference;(3)One of the reasons for the stickiness of executive compensation is that when the performance decreases,the industry reference characteristics of executive compensation are enhanced,and the performance oriented attribute is weakened,which makes the sensitivity of compensation performance significantly weaker than when the performance rises,resulting in compensation stickiness.