从逐底竞争到策略性模仿——绩效考核生态化如何影响地方政府环境治理的竞争策略?

From Race-to-the-bottom to Strategic Imitation:How does the Ecological Transformation of Government Performance Assessment affect the Competing Strategy of Environmental Governance across Chinese Local Governments

【问题】随着约束性生态指标被纳入官员考核体系和环保考核“一票否决制”的确立,环境治理绩效日益成为地方官员晋升的关键要素。绩效考核的生态化转变对地方政府间环境规制执行有何影响?生态考核具体指标设置的差异性,是否会最终呈现为区域环境治理的不同绩效表现?【方法】论文基于2000—2016年间中国30个省级行政单位的数据,采用空间计量实证分析方法(SAC模型),分别以环境规制强度(排污费征收)和污染物排放(SO 2和CO 2)为因变量进行数据分析。【发现】地方政府的减排绩效对中央考核地方官员所设定的生态指标表现出高度敏感性。各省在执行环境规制和落实减排责任时具有空间关联性,经济发展水平越相近的省份之间呈现出更强的模仿效应。【贡献】地方政府间环境治理的竞争态势正在由逐底竞争转变为策略性模仿,而这一竞争策略与官员拔擢考核指标的变化密切相关。本研究为推动地方政府致力于协调统一的环境治理行动明确了政策方向:基于官员拔擢环保考核的目标治理机制能够避免环境治理分权中的政策执行阻梗,而这一纵向激励须以环境共治中的区域协调机制作为保障;另外,推动经济高质量发展、区域发展模式转型及环保技术创新扩散等也是实现整体性环境治理的必要内容。

Motivation: Competition among local officials for promotion in China is increasingly being affected by their region’s environmental indicators. The importance of ecological indicators was introduced into the assessment system and the promotion veto mechanism by the central authority. How have the competing strategies of environmental governance among local governments been impacted by this transformation of the promotion process?Would governing performance be different if the ecological indicators were not the same?Methodology: Based on a dataset derived from 30 Chinese provinces from the period2000-2016,this study used the spatial econometric approach( SAC model) by setting environmental regulation stringency and pollutants emission amounts as dependent variables,respectively.Findings: Local government performance in reducing pollutant emissions was highly sensitive to the specific indicators set by the central authority to assess local officials.Spatial correlations appeared when a province implemented environmental regulations and was dedicated to reducing emissions. If two provinces were at a similar economic level,then the imitation effect between them regarding environmental governance was pronounced.Contribution: Competition among localities in environmental governance has turned a race-to-the-bottom into strategic imitation. It has apparently been impacted by the ecological indicators set for promotion assessments. This study highlights the policy benefits of incentivizing local officials to coordinate environmental governance. This objective-targeted governance mechanism is both embedded in the environmental performance measurements for officials seeking promotion and guaranteed by regional cooperation and coordination mechanisms. It can also fundamentally overcome the policy-implementation-hindrance in environmental decentralization. Besides, it’s essential to construct a holistic environmental governance system by achieving highquality development,promoting the transformation of growth patterns,and facilitating the diffusion of technological innovation.