《跨大西洋贸易与投资伙伴协议》投资法庭的司法问题

The Judicial Problem in Investment Court of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

《跨大西洋贸易与投资伙伴协议》试图以投资法庭机制,增强投资仲裁案件中仲裁员的法官属性,以改变传统商事仲裁模式下“去政治化”所导致的对于仲裁员监管的缺失。但投资法庭将仲裁员科层化管理的意图未能彻底解决其固有的弊端。一方面,过高的任职要求将导致投资法庭无人可用的局面。另一方面,在“协议”尝试解决投资法庭仲裁员的身份归属问题时,却忽略了公正性才是仲裁事务的根本。因此,投资法庭机制除了进一步地减少仲裁员的数量之外,应当首先实现投资仲裁审理的同一化与规范化,才能为投资仲裁制度进一步地改革奠定基础。

The investment court system that Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership intends to set up,attempts to make the arbitrators of traditional investment arbitration more like judges,to change the profitability and lack of supervision of arbitrators caused by the depoliticization of commercial arbitration models.However,the appeal of the investment court to stratify arbitrators failed to completely resolve the inherent disadvantages.The high standards for appointments lead to a situation that no arbitrator is available for investment court.In addition,the core claim of arbitration justice is set aside because of the illusion of whether he/she is a judge or an arbitrator.Therefore,the best result that the investment court system can achieved is to artificially reduce the number of arbitrators to quickly achieve the identity and standardization of investment arbitration,thereby laying the foundation for further reform.