晋升激励与城镇化——基于地级市数据的证据

Local Officials’Incentive and Urbanization in China

城镇化是政府视作下一轮经济增长的动力,但对其背后的决定因素及当前呈现出的土地城市化快于人口城市化的结构性特征,现有文献却鲜有研究。本文认为地方官员晋升激励是造成上述现象的重要成因。基于地级市数据并利用党代会前后各地区领导班子换届作为自然实验,本研究采用双差分方法为该假设提供实证证据。我们发现那些由第1任期官员主政地区的城市扩张速度比那些由第2期官员主政的地区快18%。这种差别是由于第2任期官员晋升可能性显著降低所致。晋升因素可以解释2000年以来我国城市扩张的31%,但这种激励没有提高人口城市化进度。人口城市化的提高更多地是由市场化因素驱动。这些结论意味着实现"以人为核心"的新型城镇化必须促使地方政府从追求GDP的"经营性政府"转变为注重公共服务的"服务型政府"。

China has experienced urbanization on an unprecedented scale,with important implications for both domestic and global economic development.However,few researchers have explored the underlying reasons for the imbalance between the spatial expansion of China’s cities and the growth of its urban population.This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature from the political economic perspective by examining the effects of political career incentives on China’s urbanization.Based on the panel data from 2000 to 2011 of prefecture-level municipalities in China and using the personnel changes of 17 th local party congresses as a quasi-natural experiment,we employ difference-in-differences method to overcome omitted variable problems.Empirical analysis reveals that the growth rate of built-up area in cities with new party secretaries was 13.77%higher than that in cities with second-term party secretaries.In addition,housing prices increased 21.91%more rapidly in the cities with new leaders,and the corresponding decrease in arable land happened approximately 1.9%more quickly.We attribute this variation to the reduced likelihood of promotion of party secretaries in their second term.Our findings show the career incentives explain 33%of the expansion of China’s urban areas,and market-related factors such as economic growth explain 16%of this expansion.However,there is no evidence that promotion incentives increase urban residency,the income of urban residents or government expenditure on public goods.