大股东参与定增并购、业绩承诺与利益输送——基于百润股份收购巴克斯酒业案例的研究

Private Placement and Acquisitions with Major Shareholders Participation,Performance Commitment and Tunneling——Based on A Case Study of Bairun’s Acquisition of Bacchus

立足大股东行为视角,探索大股东参与定增并购情境下业绩承诺对利益输送的影响机制,并以百润股份收购巴克斯酒业为例,考察在定增并购和业绩承诺实施的不同阶段大股东利益输送的实现方式和经济后果。研究发现:业绩承诺在短期内未能有效抑制大股东利益输送行为。从长期看,承诺期间业绩承诺的激励和约束效应可以在一定程度上抑制大股东的利益输送行为,但仍存在大股东进行高额派现和转增以备失诺补偿以及通过盈余管理实现"精准达标"以避免业绩补偿的行为;承诺期结束后,大股东可能利用信息优势通过精准减持和股权质押实现利益输送。研究结论对于监管部门完善业绩承诺契约设计、强化中小投资者利益保护机制,保障定增并购规范运行具有政策启示。

This paper examines the mechanism of how performance commitment influences tunneling in private placement and acquisitions from the perspective of major shareholders’ behavior,and investigates the channels and economic consequences of major shareholders’ tunneling in different stages of private placement and acquisitions and performance commitment based on the case of Bairun’s acquisition of Bacchus. We find that performance commitment fails to effectively suppress major shareholders’ tunneling in the short term. The incentive and regulation effect of performance commitment may weaken major shareholders’ tunneling to some extent during the commitment period,but dividend policy and earnings management may still be used to reduce compensation. Major shareholders may utilize information advantages to realize tunneling through precise reduction of holdings and pledge of shares after the commitment expires. The conclusion has policy implications for regulatory authorities to improve the contract design of performance commitment,strengthen the interest protection mechanism for small and medium investors,and ensure healthy operation of private placement and acquisitions.