康德与意向性问题--兼论胡塞尔的行为意向性模型

Kant and the Problem of Intentionality:Supplemented with a Discussion of the Deficit of Husserlian Model of Act-Intentionality

“意向性”问题是现象学中的一个重要问题,但究其实质则无非是“对象性”问题。依据康德对“表象何以能有一个对象”这个问题的论述,可以揭示出一种康德式的意向性模型:康德将“事实”的“形式”方面的可能性条件归之于主体依据“关系范畴”的“综合”,作为其“质料”的诸素朴的“现象”又有着自身的“形式”和“质料”;“现象”的“形式”进而被回溯到和关联到主体依据“量和质的范畴”的“综合”,而“现象”之中的在先被给予的“质料”的对象性,在康德那里是被归之于“空间性”的。“空间性”与“原初材料的对象性”的这个关联是康德式“意向性”理论中独特的方面。与康德的“综合”活动一样,胡塞尔的“立义”也不能创立“原初材料的对象性”。因此,在康德式意向性模型的衬托下,胡塞尔“行为”意向性模型中所隐含的“在先被给予的‘对象性材料’”这个预设凸显出来。这恰恰是胡塞尔“行为”意向性模型亟需补强的地方。

The important problem of“intentionality”in phenomenology is in essence nothing other than the problem of“objectivity”.On the basis of Kant’s exposition of the problem,“how can the representation have an object”,we can reveal a Kantian model of intentionality:Kant ascribes the possible condition of the formal aspect of“fact”to the subject’s relation-categorical“synthesis”;Its material aspect,namely the primitive“appearances”,have again their own“form”and“matter”;Kant attributes the possible condition of the formal aspect of“appearance”to the subject’s quantity-quality-categorical“synthesis”,but the objectivity of“the given matter”in the“appearance”must be ascribed to the“spatiality”.This connection between the“spatiality”and the objectivity of the primitive matter is a remarkable moment in the Kantian model of intentionality.Like the Kantian“synthesis”neither can the Husserlian“apprehension”leads to the objectivity of this primitive matter.Therefore,in the light of this Kantian model of intentionality the hidden assumption of the objectivity of the given matter in the Husserlian model of act-intentionality become noticeable.This segment in the Husserlian model must be reinforced.