监管与反监管:CEO自恋与公司创业投资

Monitoring and Anti-monitoring:CEO Narcissism and Corporate Venture Capital

基于高阶梯队理论,探究CEO自恋对公司创业投资的正向影响。进一步地,基于高阶梯队理论中管理自主权概念,提出企业内部监管(制衡股东持股比例、独立董事)和外部监管(政府监管)通过降低CEO的管理自主权弱化CEO自恋与公司创业投资之间的正向关系。而CEO兼任董事长(两职合一)和政治联系分别减弱企业内部监管和外部监管的负向调节作用,最终增强CEO自恋与公司创业投资之间的正向关系。基于来自医药、电子设备和汽车制造业206家沪深上市公司(2011~2016年)的数据,统计结果总体上支持了上述假设。文章不仅对公司创业研究、CEO自恋研究以及高阶梯队理论具有重要的理论启示,还为CEO任命、公司治理设计以及政府政策制定提供了思路。

In view of the importance of narcissism in CEO's psychological traits,this study posits that CEO narcissism has a positive impact on corporate venture capital from the cognition and motivation perspectives.Furthermore,based on the concept of managerial discretion,this paper argues that internal monitoring(block ownership,independent directors)and external monitoring(government regulation)will negatively moderate the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and corporate venture capital by reducing the CEO's managerial discretion.In addition,CEO's managerial discretion will expand when the CEO serves as the chairman of the board or has political ties,thereby weakening the constraints of internal and external monitoring.Findings based on the panel data of 206 Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies(2011-2016)from the pharmaceutical,electronic equipment and automotive industries support our theoretical predictions.The study not only has important theoretical implications for corporate entrepreneurship research,upper echelons theory and CEO narcissism research,but also has implications for corporate CEO appointment and corporate governance design and government policy formulation.