政府创新激励干预下的分析师关注与企业研发投入——以“中国制造2025”与“一带一路”为例的实证研究

The Effects of Analyst Coverage on R&D Investment Under the Government's Innovation Promotion——An Empirical Study on“Made in China 2025”and“the Belt and Road”Initiative

随着股票市场与企业研发活动的联系愈发紧密,分析师关注与企业研发投入的关系受到的关注也越来越多。虽然现有以公司治理过程中各主体为核心研究两者关系的文献取得了一些成果,但外部政府干预的作用却在一定程度上被忽视。本文以“中国制造2025”和“一带一路”为例,对分析师关注作用于企业研发投入的机制和政府创新激励对该机制的影响进行分析。在基于文献建构理论假设的基础上,引入A股制造业企业2013~2018年的数据作为样本,使用双重差分方法对机制假设进行了检验。实证结果显示:分析师关注对企业研发投入有负向的直接影响,但政府创新激励的信号发出后分析师关注对相关企业的研发投入又具有独立于原有效应之外的正效应。这一结果表明,一般情况下分析师关注会基于“施压机制”抑制企业的研发投入,而政府创新激励的出台则能创造条件使这种“施压机制”激励企业为研发活动投入资金,在一定程度上缓解分析师关注原有的消极影响。

The relationship between analyst coverage and R&D investment has drawn a lot of attention when R&D activities of firms get closer to stock market.However,the implications of external government intervention are ignored by writings which mostly focus on corporate governance.To fill in this gap,this paper tries to take the“Made in China 2025”and“the Belt and Road”Initiative as examples to discuss the effects of industrial-level innovation promotion on the relationship between analyst coverage and R&D investment.By employing the data of A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2018 as a sample,this paper introduces the difference-in-differences to examine the theoretical hypotheses constructed based on literature.The empirical result shows that analyst coverage has a directly negative effect on R&D investment,but this effect will get weaker or even become positive after the implementation of a government innovation promotion.That is to say,analyst coverage normally restrains R&D investment,but the government's innovation promotion could prove a“blessing in disguise”.