政府补助、高管超额薪酬与企业研发投入--一个有调节的中介效应模型检验

Governmental Subsidy,Excessive Remuneration for Senior Executives and Enterprise Research and Development Investment:Test of the Model with adjustable Mediating Effect

通过构建有调节的中介效应模型,引入高管超额薪酬这一中介变量和管理层权力这一调节变量,进一步明晰政府补助作用于企业研发投入的传导路径和情境机制。利用沪深A股上市公司2014—2018年的经验数据进行实证分析,研究表明:政府补助能显著促进企业研发投入的增加;高管超额薪酬在政府补助与企业研发投入之间发挥了部分中介作用;管理层权力在政府补助与高管超额薪酬之间并无显著调节作用,但在高管超额薪酬与企业研发投入之间发挥了负向调节作用。最后对充分发挥政府补助对企业创新能力提升的刺激作用提出相应的建议。

By establishing a model with adjustable mediating effect and adopting the mediating variable of remuneration for senior executives and adjusting variable of managerial power,this paper further clarifies the impact of governmental subsidy on the transmitting path and situational mechanism of enterprise research and development investment.Also,this paper makes an empirical analysis of the 2014—2018 empirical data of the listed companies of A Shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen.The results show that governmental subsidy can remarkably push the increase of enterprise research and development investment,that remuneration for senior executives partially plays a mediating role between governmental subsidy and enterprise research and development investment,that managerial power doesn′t have any obvious effect between governmental subsidy and enterprise research and development investment but it has a negative effect between remuneration for senior executives and enterprise research and development investment.Finally,this paper puts forward some corresponding suggestions on how to give full play to the stimulating function of governmental subsidy in the promotion of enterprise innovation ability.