摘要
争夺股权控制成为企业跨国整合关注的热点之一。本文从供应链视角,以国内本土企业与外海企业股权合作为基础,将股权比例和股权控制作为股权合作分析的切入点,针对本土企业基于两阶段序贯决策模式,构建出本土企业供应链跨国股权合作的分析框架;然后基于Nash Bargain博弈,建立起供应链跨国整合下的股权配置决策模型,优化出各自股比;同时考虑跨国供应链本土企业与外海企业的股权争夺是一个多阶段动态博弈过程,引入股权控制因素,通过Rubinstein Bargain决策方法,进一步构建出基于股权控制和股权争夺的跨国供应链合作的动态博弈策略,在此基础上,优化出不同合作模式下双方的最优利润,并进一步推导出本土企业和跨国企业基于股权控制的股权最优比,和在此比例下合作前提条件。通过研究发现:本土制造商和外海供应商要想取得股权合作的成功,最先是受到本土制造商自身盈利能力的影响;而是否进一步在外海建厂进行股权合作,则受到国内市场基本容量、两国所得税率差异和跨国供应链内部运作成本所左右;另外,在静态Nash Bargain和动态Rubinstein Bargain博弈决策下,后者更能反映出海外供应商与本国制造商合作时,双方对股权比例的敏感度;而且本土企业要想取得控股权,双方股权配置比例差距不是很大的情况下,双方才有合作意愿;任何一方的绝对控股,将导致合作难以实现。
With the development of economic globalization and China’s vigorous implementation of the"One Belt and One Road"initiative,while foreign enterprises enter the Chinese market,Chinese enterprises are also looking for suitable partners in the global market to integrate domestic resources to optimize their own supply chain and improve their global competitiveness simultaneously.Hence transnational ownership control in global supply chain is becoming one of current research hotspots.Based on ownership cooperation of downstream local manufacturers and upstream oversea suppliers in the supply chain,focusing on the ownership ratio and ownership control between the supply chain enterprises,taking the two-stage sequential progressive decision-making model(i.e.initial stage and mature stage)for the domestic enterprise into account.The case of the manufacturer in the local market,and the manufacturer transfers to the overseas market due to cost factors in the later stage is first considered in this paper then the analysis framework of transnational ownership cooperation in supply chain is explored.Furthermore,through introducing static and dynamic bargaining game methods,considering the ownership cooperation between the local market and overseas market in the transnational supply chain is a multi-stage dynamic game process,Nash and Rubinstein game models for ownership cooperation are established,it studies ownership allocation mechanism and ratio at the initial and mature stage respectively.What is more,it gets the optimal profits of both partners under different cooperation modes,and derives the optimal ownership ratio based on the ownership control.At last,the different optimal options for transnational ownership cooperation are obtained in different scenarios,which will benefit local companies to make right decision.It is found that when the local manufacturer and overseas supplier want to implement the ownership cooperation,the profitability of local manufacturer should be taken into consideration first,and whether to further achieve the ownership cooperation depends on the basic capacity of the domestic market,the difference in income tax rates between the two countries and the internal operation cost of the transnational supply chain.In addition,if the local enterprise wants to acquire the controlling stake,the two sides will have the willingness to cooperate only when the ownership allocation proportion gap is not very large.The case of absolute control of either party will make the cooperation difficult to achieve.
作者
黎继子
汪忠瑞
刘春玲
刘芳兵
LI Ji-zi;WANG Zhong-rui;LIU Chun-ling;LIU Fnag-bin(School of Management,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031,China;School of Management,Huazhong Science and Technology University,Wuhan 430070,China;Research Center of Supply Chain System,Wuhan Textile University,Wuhan 430073,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第11期110-119,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71872076,71964023,71472143)。
关键词
供应链
跨国合作
股权控制
序贯决策
博弈策略
supply chain
transnational-ownership cooperation
ownership game
sequential decision-making
game tactics