地方政府金融监管两难困境的演化博弈分析及仿真研究

Evolutionary Game Analysis and Simulation Research on the Dilemma of Local Government Financial Supervision

在信息不对称和有限理性的情况下,将动态演化博弈的方法运用到地方金融监管中,建立地方金融监管机构和地方金融组织的演化博弈模型,通过求解复制动态方程和分析进化稳定策略,并利用Matlab进行仿真分析,得出地方政府和中央政府在罚金等之间的分成比例、声誉和寻租因素对地方监管机构和地方金融组织的演化博弈行为的影响,可清晰地看到地方政府在发展地方经济和维护区域金融稳定的两难困境下的策略选择.

In the case of asymmetric information and limited rationality,the dynamic evolutionary game method is applied to the local financial supervision,and established the two-stage evolutionary game model of local financial supervision institution and local financial organization.By solving the replication dynamic equation and analyzing the evolutionary stabilization strategy,using MATLAB to simulate and analyze that the dividing ratio,reputation and rentseeking factors between local government and central government in fines have influence on the evolution game behavior of local regulatory institutions and local financial organizations,which can clearly see the strategic choice of local government under the dilemma of developing local economy and maintaining regional financial stability.