摘要
2019年上半年,中国银保监会宣布接管包商银行,这一事件是20年来金融监管机构再度出手整治问题商业银行。包商银行事件打破原有的同业刚兑预期,使得金融市场面临着短期流动性冲击。包商银行事件作为一个特殊个案,尽管其体量与规模无法影响到整个银行系统的根基,但可被视为金融供给侧改革过程中的一次风险压力测试,虽然短期内难免对中小银行具有负面影响,但却进一步加速了中小银行改革的步伐。与包商银行被接管导致我国银行同业市场违约风险上升并加剧同业市场运转困难这一结果不同的是,美国的银行业拥有单个银行常态化破产以及退出的成熟经验。本文通过对比我国及美国中小银行救助机制,提出我国要借鉴美国中小银行市场化退出的监管经验,在金融供给侧改革框架内设计我国中小银行救助机制。
In the first half of 2019,the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission announced the takeover of Baoshang Bank(BSB).This incident is another remediation of problematic commercial banks by financial regulators in the past 20 years.The BSB event broke the original interbank exchange expectations,making the finan⁃cial market face short-term liquidity shocks.As a special case,although BSB's size and scale cannot affect the foun⁃dation of the entire banking system,it can be regarded as a risk stress test in the process of financial supply-side re⁃form.And although this event will inevitably have a negative impact on small and medium-sized banks in the short term,it will further accelerate the reform of small and medium-sized banks.Different from the result that BSB's take⁃over has led to an increase in the risk of default in China's interbank market and aggravated the difficulties in the op⁃eration of the interbank market,the US banking industry has mature experience in the normalized bankruptcy and exit of single bank.This paper compares the rescue mechanism of small and medium-sized banks in China and the United States,and proposes that China should learn from the supervision experience of the market-oriented exit of small and medium-sized banks in the United States,and design the rescue mechanism of small and medium-sized banks in the framework of financial supply-side reform.
出处
《西南金融》
北大核心
2020年第12期44-54,共11页
Southwest Finance
关键词
中小银行
问题银行
银行救助
不良资产处置
交易对手风险
系统性金融风险
银行退出机制
银行破产
small and medium-sized banks
problematic banks
bank bailouts
non-performing asset disposal
counterparty risk
systemic financial risks
bank exit mechanism
bankruptcy of banks