组合措施下政府与企业排污行为演化博弈

Evolutionary game of government and enterprise pollution discharge behavior under combined measures

为研究排污企业应对不同惩罚和补贴组合措施的行为策略,将演化博弈理论与系统动力学方法结合,构建基于政府与排污企业双方的演化博弈模型.以政府和排污企业双方利益为核心,对其在不同惩罚和补贴措施下的企业行为策略和演化稳定性进行分析.结果显示,在静态惩罚补贴措施下,政府和企业策略行为无法达到演化稳定点,政府静态政策不会对企业合法排污行为产生推动作用.在动态惩罚补贴措施下,动态惩罚和动态补贴措施对推动企业合法排污行为更为有效,政府可根据排污企业行为制定双边动态策略.

In order to study the behavior strategies of sewage enterprises when they are facing the different punishment and subsidy combination measures,the Evolutionary Game Theory and system dynamic method were combined to construct an evolutionary game model which took both government and sewage enterprises into account.The model took the interests of both government and sewage enterprises as the core,and was used to evaluate the behavior strategies of sewage enterprises and evolutionary stability under the different punishments and subsidy measures.The results indicated that the strategic behavior of the government and enterprises cannot reach the point of evolutionary stability under the static punishments and subsidy measures,and the legal discharge of enterprises was not promoted by the static government policies.In contrast,the legal discharge by the sewage enterprises was more efficiently promoted under a dynamic regulation of punishment and subsidy.Hence,the bilateral dynamic policy could be formulated by the government in accordance with the behavior of sewage enterprises.