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基于委托代理理论的国有企业治理问题 被引量:1

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摘要 国有企业是国民经济的支柱,但是随着现代企业制度的逐渐完善,国有企业的委托代理问题也越来越突出,制约了其更好地发展。国有企业由于存在委托代理非市场化、委托人职权不明等问题,委托代理关系中参与约束和激励相容约束更难束紧,委托治理问题更难解决。为此,必须要明确国有企业的产权,规范代理关系,推进国有企业的市场化进程,完善代理人激励机制,以解决委托代理问题。
作者 黄天添
出处 《行政事业资产与财务》 2020年第24期37-38,共2页 Assets and Finances in Administration and Institution
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