摘要
在考虑消费者渠道偏好和低碳偏好的基础上,使用以制造商为主的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了单一传统零售渠道、网上直销双渠道和网上分销双渠道中各成员的最优定价决策与减排策略,以及两种双渠道的利润分享协调策略。研究发现:当制造商引入网上直销和分销渠道后,能够有效增加制造商的最优单位减排量;在开通新的渠道后,传统零售商的利润总是会降低,而当消费者对网上销售渠道的偏好处于某一范围内时,制造商的利润会增加。本文通过设计利润分享机制来协调制造商和传统零售商的利润问题,使得供应链成员的利润实现Pareto改进。
Based on the consumer channel preferences and low carbon preferences,this paper uses the Stackelberg game model based on the manufacturer to compare and study the impact of each member of the single traditional retail channel,the e-tail dual-channel and the distribution dual-channel on the emission reduction,and emission reduction strategy and two dual-channel revenue sharing coordination strategies.The study finds that when manufacturers introduce online direct sales and distribution channels,they can effectively increase the manufacturer’s optimal unit emission reductions;after opening new channels,traditional retailers’profits will always decrease,while consumer preferences are within a certain range,the profit of the manufacturer will increase.In this paper,the profit sharing mechanism is designed to coordinate the profit problems of manufacturers and traditional retailers,so that the profit of supply chain members can be improved by Pareto.
作者
梁喜
张余婷
LIANG Xi;ZHANG Yu-ting(School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第12期107-117,共11页
Operations Research and Management Science
关键词
低碳双渠道供应链
消费者偏好
碳排放
利润分享机制
dual-channel supply chain
consumer preference
carbon emission
Rrvenue sharing coordination strategies