摘要
本文以2014—2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察了公司实施股权激励计划对其股价暴跌风险的影响。研究发现实施股权激励计划的公司,其股价暴跌风险显著增加;将公司股权结构纳入影响因素研究后,发现机构投资者作为专业的投资者,可以有效抑制大股东的掏空行为,并能有效抑制管理层的自利行为,从而显著降低股权激励与公司股价暴跌风险。本文的研究深化了社会公众对股权激励在资本市场中作用的认识,促进了股市平稳有序的发展。
This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as samples to investigate the impact of equity incentive on stock price crash risk. The results show that the price crash risk increases significantly in the companies that have successfully implemented the equity incentive plan recently. After considering the ownership structure of the company into the influencing factors, it is found that institutional investors, as professional investors, can effectively restrain the tunneling behavior of large shareholders and alleviate the agency problem between shareholders and management, thus significantly reducing the relationship between equity incentive and the risk of stock price collapse. The study of this paper deepens the understanding of the role of equity incentive in the capital market, which is of great significance to promote the stable development of the stock market.
作者
孙俊奇
吕雪辉
SUN Jun-qi;LYU Xue-hui(Shenzhen Financial Stability&Development Institute,518000,Shenzhen,Guangdong,China)
出处
《特区经济》
2020年第11期53-57,共5页
Special Zone Economy
关键词
股权激励
股价暴跌风险
机构投资者
Equity Incentive
Stock Price Crash Risk
Institutional Investors