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基于博弈论的海洋渔业融资约束问题研究 被引量:1

The Financing Constraints of Marine Fisheries Based on Game Theory
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摘要 疫情的冲击使社会经济发展受到影响,我国政府出台一系列激励性政策,力求恢复企业正常生产经营。然而要实现金融支持的精准投放,亟须厘清目前海洋渔业融资约束形成的原因,从而有的放矢。文章在博弈论的框架下探讨海洋渔业融资约束的形成与破解,根据现实情况将海洋渔业融资交易行为定为不完全信息动态博弈。研究结果表明:海洋渔业经营主体提供越高价值的抵押物,越易达成博弈的最优均衡,从而有效减少融资约束;金融机构越能准确识别海洋渔业经营主体生产投资活动的回报收益率,也越易达成博弈的最优均衡,从而有效减少融资约束。在此基础上,建议:扩大针对海洋渔业经营主体的融资抵押物范围,如海域使用权等用益物权可仿照土地经营权进行抵押试点;鼓励和引导设立相关担保机构和专项基金,从而在抵押物缺失的情况下支持海洋渔业经营主体的生产性融资;金融机构可尝试与海洋渔业经营主体建立长期的合作关系,从而降低双方的信息不对称程度,进而有效识别回报收益率,避免因潜在风险而产生的融资约束。 The impact of the epidemic had affected the social and economic development.The Chinese government had issued a series of incentive policies to restore normal production and operation in society.However,in order to accurately provide financial support,it was necessary to clarify the formation of existing marine fishery financing constraints.So as to be targeted.This paper explored the formation and resolution of marine fishery financing constraints under the framework of game theory.According to the actual situation,this financing transaction was considered to be a dynamic game with incomplete information,and then through game analysis:the marine fisheries management entity provided a higher value mortgage.The easier it was to achieve the optimal equilibrium of the game and the effective reduction of financing constraints,the more accurately the financial institutions could identify the rate of return of the investment and production activities of the marine fishery business entities,the easier it was to achieve the optimal equilibrium of the game and effectively reduce the financing constraints.Therefore,it was recommended that the relevant departments could increase the scope of financing collateral targeted at marine fishery business entities,and the usable property rights such as the right to use sea areas should also be modeled on land management rights.The local government could encourage and guide the establishment of local guarantee organizations.Fund to support the financing of production and operation activities in the absence of collateral;financial institutions could try to build long-term cooperative relations with fisheries business entities to reduce the degree of information asymmetry between the 2 parties,so that the return rate could be more effectively identified to avoid financing constraints due to moral hazard when financing needs were raised.
作者 李煦 平瑛 LI Xu;PING Ying(College of Economics and Management,Shanghai Ocean University,Shanghai 201306,China)
出处 《海洋开发与管理》 2020年第12期16-20,共5页 Ocean Development and Management
基金 象山海洋经济发展战略研究项目(D-8005-19-0312)。
关键词 融资约束 博弈论 海洋渔业 金融机构 复工复产 Financing constraints Game theory Marine fisheries Financial institution Return to work and production
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