考虑定向能力的竞争性企业优惠券定向投放与定价策略

Strategy of targeted delivery and pricing for competitive corporate coupon with orientation capability

企业定向投放优惠券的精准性对优惠券面值、企业利润等均有较大的影响.针对企业定向优惠券的精准投放问题,运用博弈论研究双寡头竞争环境下,企业定向投放能力对优惠券面值和企业利润的影响,并进一步将定向能力作为决策变量引入模型进行拓展研究.研究结果表明:当定向能力达到一定阈值时,企业会在"忠诚市场"实行高价策略,而在"竞争市场"实行低价策略;定向能力对企业利润呈双向调节作用,即在阈值范围内,定向能力的提升会带来更高的企业利润,但超过阈值时,定向能力的提升将会降低企业利润;定向能力的投资成本系数较大时,拥有较多忠诚客户的企业倾向于提高定向能力;反之,竞争双方都将提高定向能力以增加企业利润.

The precision of a firms’targeted coupon has a greater impact on the coupon value and firms’profit.Aiming at the problem of precise distribution of targeted coupon,this paper uses game theory to study the impact of targeting ability on the coupon value and firms’profit in the duopoly competition environment.Furthermore,the paper introduces targeting ability as a decision variable into the model for further research.The results show that when the targeting ability reaches a certain threshold,the firm will implement a high price strategy in the loyal market and a low price strategy in the competitive market.The targeting ability plays a bidirectional role in the regulation of a firms’profit.That is when the targeting ability is within the range of threshold,the improvement of targeting ability will bring higher profit.However,the improvement of targeting ability will reduce the profit if beyond the threshold.When the investment cost coefficient of targeting ability is quite high,the firm with more loyal customers tends to improve the targeting ability.Conversely,both firms will improve the targeting ability to increase firms’profit.