财政分权、地方政府行为偏向与公共服务效率损失——来自文化服务供给的证据

Fiscal decentralization,local government behavior bias and loss of public service efficiency:evidence from the supply of cultural services

在将地方政府行为划分为投资、收入与制度偏向性行为下,探讨过度财政分权引致公共服务供给效率损失的内在机制,并以体现人民发展性需求的公共文化服务为例,构建动态面板模型,采用SYS-GMM估计法进行经验验证,结果得出:(1)财政分权与公共文化服务供给效率间存在倒"U"型关系,在实现公共文化服务供给效率最大化的目标下,存在最优的财政分权边界;(2)在提高公共文化服务供给效率的目标下,最优财政分权边界存在"发达地区高、欠发达地区低"的区域特征,同时,政府治理能力优势区的财政分权适度范围也大于治理能力劣势区;(3)财政分权会通过地方政府行为影响公共文化服务供给效率:即适度分权能够扭转政府偏向性行为,提升公共文化服务供给效率,但过度分权会导致地方政府投资、收入与制度偏向,造成公共文化服务供给效率损失。

This paper divides local government behavior into investment,income and institutional bias behavior,and discusses the internal mechanism of the loss of public service supply efficiency caused by excessive fiscal decentralization.Taking the public cultural services that reflect people’s developmental needs as an example,it constructs a dynamic panel model:by using SYSGMM estimation method for empirical verification.The results are as follows:(1)There is an inverted"U"relationship between fiscal decentralization and the efficiency of public cultural service supply,and under the goal of maximizing the efficiency of public cultural service supply,there is an optimal fiscal decentralization boundary;(2)The optimal fiscal decentralization boundary has the regional characteristics of"high in developed regions and low in underdeveloped regions",and the moderate fiscal decentralization scope of the superior area of governance capability is also larger than that of the disadvantaged area;(3)Fiscal decentralization affects the efficiency of public cultural service supply through local government behavior:moderate decentralization can correct the biased behavior of government,and then improve the efficiency of public cultural service supply,but when the decentralization is excessive,the local government investment,income and institutional behavior will be biased,resulting in the loss of public cultural service supply efficiency.