违反FRAND承诺行为的反垄断法规制--兼评美国高通案

FRAND and Antitrust

FRAND义务属于合同义务,大多数违反合同行为并不违反反垄断法。但这并不意味着,因为违反FRAND义务构成违约,所以它不能同时构成垄断行为。垄断行为的认定问题并不取决于行为是否违反某个具体协议,而是取决于它是否造成竞争损害。任何反垄断法案件都必须结合发生被评价行为的市场环境进行考察。由多家企业共同运营的标准制定组织(SSO)属于合营事业。在此场景下,反垄断法的目的是要评估受诉限制在该合营事业中的运作机制,并谴责具有不合理反竞争性的限制。第9巡回区联邦上诉法院在美国高通案中并没有采用这种评价方式;它还判决采用损害竞争者而非消费者的行为评价标准,这与数十年来形成的反垄断法理相冲突。单方拒绝交易的反垄断法问题经常与必需设施法则混为一谈。该法则立基于如下观点,即某些资产对商业成功极其重要,因此所有者有义务与他人进行分享。阿斯攀案确立的拒绝交易规则则立基于具体的先期合同义务、信赖和路径依赖以及后期毁弃承诺。必需设施法则助长竞争者消极被动,阿斯攀案的拒绝交易规则则鼓励竞争者投资。许多合营事业都涉及对专用资产的大量沉没投资,因此更契合适用阿斯攀案规则。相反,并没有发生证据表明系统性的“反向劫持”,即标准实施者共谋排斥专利权人或者压制许可费。就附FRAND义务的专利获得禁令的权利取决于原告自身的“清洁之手”,而违法FRAND协议或反垄断法会致其“不洁之手”;这一权利还受到专利权人自身如下承诺的约束,即向愿意支付FRAND许可费的任何人许可专利。

FRAND obligations are contractual,and most breaches of contract do not violate antitrust law.However,it does not mean that,because a FRAND violation is a breach of contract,it cannot also be an antitrust violation.Under certain circumstances,a patentee’s violation of a FRAND commitment also violates the antitrust laws.Every antitrust case must consider the market environment in which conduct is evaluated.SSOs operated by multiple firms are joint ventures.Antitrust’s role in this scenario is to evaluate how challenged restraints operate within the venture and condemn unreasonably anticompetitive practices.The Ninth Circuit’s approaches in the Qualcomm litigation did not do that,also held that conduct should be tested by its harm to rivals,not to consumers,conflicting with decades of antitrust jurisprudence.The antitrust issue of unilateral refusals to deal is too often confused with the essential facility doctrine.The essential facility doctrine is based on the idea that some assets are so essential to commerce that the owner has a duty to share them.By contrast,the Aspen refusal to deal rule is rooted in a specific prior contractual obligation,reliance and path dependence,and subsequent repudiation.While the essential facility doctrine is conducive to competitor passivity,the Aspen refusal to deal rule facilitates competitor investment.Many joint ventures involve a signifi cant sunk investment in assets that are dedicated to the venture,more suitable for the Aspen rule.On the contrary,there is no evidence of systemic“holdout”,which occurs when implementers conspire to exclude patentees or suppress royalties.Entitlement to an injunction on a FRAND-encumbered patent depends on the plaintiff’s own“clean hands,”which is undermined by its violation of FRAND agreements or the antitrust laws;it is also limited by the patentee’s own contractual commitment to license out a patent to one who is willing to pay a FRAND royalty.