摘要
美国2020年《纵向合并指南》(《指南》)是美国反垄断执法机构在纵向合并领域对后芝加哥学派观点一次迟来的回应。与中国不同,《指南》把相关市场的内涵与竞争损害直接联系,并围绕竞争损害理论区分相关市场与关联产品。相关市场的实质是竞争损害发生的范围,关联产品的实质是竞争损害的切入方式。认定纵向合并交易的竞争损害,应考察合并后实体通过关联产品从事封锁相关市场中的竞争对手或提高竞争对手成本等封锁性行为的能力和动力。考察能力因素的关键是评估竞争对手转换购买关联产品的替代品的能力,考察动力因素的关键是评估合并后实体能否从削弱竞争对手的封锁性行为中获利。在此过程中,还应重视对消除双重边际化等促进竞争效果的评估。
The US Vertical Merger Guidelines issued in 2020 is a belated response of US antitrust enforcement agencies to the Post-Chicago school in vertical merger area.Unlike in China,the guidelines relate the connotation of the relevant market directly to the competition harm and distinguish the relevant market from the related product.The essence of relevant market is the place in which competition harm occurs,and the essence of related product is the cutting way to competition harm.When evaluating the potential competition harm of a vertical merger transaction,agencies should evaluate the ability and incentive of the merged firm to foreclose its rivals in the relevant market or raise rivals'cost through related product.The key to the evaluation of ability factor is to assess whether the rivals is able to switch to the alternatives to the related product,and the key to the evaluation of the incentive factor is to analyze how likely the merged fi rm would fi nd it profi table to conduct foreclosing behavior.During the evaluation,the potential procompetitive effect such as the elimination of double marginalization of the transaction should also be considered.
出处
《竞争政策研究》
2020年第5期90-106,共17页
Competition Policy Research
