基于博弈视角的我国地方政府隐性债务异化研究

Research on Implicit Debt Alienation of Local Governments in China Based on Game Perspective

地方政府隐性债务相对于显性债务,规模庞大、透明度低、举债主体多元、债务形式多样、还款来源可持续性差。近年来,地方政府隐性债务受到广泛关注,中央出台多项政策治理整顿,但部分地区出现异化现象。通过博弈模型从静态与动态分析地方政府、中央政府在地方政府隐性债务异化中的行为选择,剖析隐性债务异化机理,发现现有条件下地方政府有异化隐性债务的冲动,仅靠地方政府间的竞争难以消除这种异化冲动,建立长期的监管与奖励机制是必要的,也是可行的,从行为经济学风险偏好角度看奖励比监管更为有效;而引入媒体监督、提升公众参政议政意愿和能力、加大随机监管检查力度等可有效降低监管与奖励成本。因此,地方政府树立正确的政绩观、建立健全监管体系是治理整顿地方隐性债务的有效途径。

Compared with the explicit debt,the implicit debt of local government is large in scale,low in transparency,diversified in debt forms and poor in sustainability of repayment sources.In recent years,scholars widely concerned the implicit debt of local government,and the central government issued a number of policies to rectify it,but the implicit debt of some regions have been alienated.Through the game model,this paper analyzes the behavior choice of local government and central government in the alienation of local government implicit debt from static and dynamic aspects and analyzes the mechanism of implicit debt alienation.It finds that local governments have the impulse to alienate implicit debt,and it is difficult to eliminate the alienation impulse only by competition among local governments.It is necessary and feasible to establish a long-term supervision and reward mechanism.From the perspective of risk preference in behavioral economics,reward is more effective than supervision;while the introduction of media supervision,enhancing the willingness and ability of the public to participate in political discussion,and strengthening the random supervision and inspection can effectively reduce the cost of supervision and reward.Therefore,the local government should establish a correct concept of political performance and establish a sound regulatory system is an effective way to deal with and rectify the local implicit debt.