三大评级巨头霸权形成过程中的法律因素及其清理路径——美国经验及其对中国的启示

The Legal Elements in Establishment of the Dominant Position of the“Big Three”in Credit Rating Business and the Approach Implications to China for Eliminating the Regulatory Reliance Thereof

穆迪等三大信用评级巨头的市场优势地位及其肆无忌惮地滥用评级霸权的种种现象,是多年以来美国政府立法培育下疯狂生长的"巨型恐龙",是美国政府金融监管背书基础上开出的"罂粟之花"。正因如此,2007年次贷危机之后,美国政府痛定思痛,对信用评级机构启动了一次时间跨度为4年之久且规模空前的监管规则清理行动。这次监管规则清理行动的根本目的,在于通过对5部国会立法与20余部部门规章进行了系统清理和全面修订,削减评级巨头享有的种种法定特权,从而最大程度地减少对美国金融监管体系评级服务的过度依赖。考虑到三大评级机构富可敌国的巨大实力、经验丰富的规则博弈能力和左右逢源的政府游说能力,美国政府在这一次规则清理行动中展示的旨在彻底清除评级机构特权的立场之坚定、决心之巨大和措施之有力,是前所未有的,亦是值得予以充分肯定的。但另一方面,在持续强化的美国法律因素导致的评级依赖不断加深的全球金融生态格局之下,此次规则清理的实际效果可能十分有限。值得警惕的是,面临贸易摩擦压力而被迫加大开放力度的中国金融监管体制,在对待信用评级机构的问题上似乎正在走美国金融监管的老路。有鉴于此,中国和其他国家与地区的金融监管机构,都应当汲取美国2007年次贷危机的教训,必须对金融监管体系中过度依赖信用评级的现象始终保持高度警惕,以免重蹈美国立法背书和监管扶持导致评级巨头肆无忌惮地滥用霸权之覆辙。

First of all,this thesis concludes that the dominating position of the"Big Three"credit rating agencies(CRAs)such as Moody Investor Services,Standard&Poor.and etc.,and their abuse of such power is a direct result of the legislating endorsement and regulatory reliance thereof.It is for this reason that the US Congress initiated an unprecedented action to review and modify numerous laws and rules in relation to the regulation of CRAs after the occurrence of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007.The aim of such an action is to screen congressional legislation and regulatory rules in relation to credit rating agencies in a systematic manner for the purpose of eliminating the legislative endorsement to and regulatory support for the giant rating agencies such as Moody Investor Services,Standard&Poor’s and Fitch.The ultimate goal of such an action is to cut the privileges granted to those rating agencies and to reduce the degree of regulatory reliance on such agencies.The screening action covers more than five legislative acts and 20 regulatory documents issued by various US financial regulators,especially those rules and regulations enacted by the SEC.The author takes of the view that the effect of this rules-screening action’s effect on changing the fundamentals of the landscape of rating services may be very limited,given the fact due to the establishment of a financial ecosystem in which the heavy reliance on ratings has been habitual.The author suggest that Chinese financial regulators should not also learn the lesson from the US regulatory history,but also be vigilant to the excessive reliance on ratings provided by those giant rating agencies.