公平关切下制造商主导的双渠道E-闭环供应链决策与协调模型

Decision Making and Coordination Model of Manufacturer Led Dual Channel E-Closed Loop Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns

针对单个制造商、单个网络平台和单个零售商构成的双渠道E-闭环供应链(E-CLSC),研究了供应链系统的最优决策及协调问题。在制造商不考虑公平关切的情况下,分别对集中决策和分散决策构建了博弈模型,并得出了最优决策;在制造商考虑公平关切的情况下,分析了分散决策下公平关切对各渠道成员最优决策的影响。研究表明,在制造商主导的双渠道E-CLSC中,制造商考虑公平关切,随着公平关切程度的增加,网络平台销售价格提高,佣金减少,导致回收率降低,零售价格提高,批发价格也提高,导致零售商利润减少,网络平台利润减少,制造商的利润增加,供应链系统的整体利润减少,所以供应链中存在公平关切不利于供应链的协调发展。为此,文章通过一个适用于三方的新型收益共享契约可以实现供应链系统的协调。最后通过算例仿真进行分析。

This paper studies the optimal decision-making and coordination of a dual channel E-CLSC composed of a single manufacturer,a single network platform and a single retailer.In the case that the manufacturer does not consider the fairness concern,the game model is constructed for centralized decision and decentralized decision respectively,and the optimal decision is obtained;when the manufacturer considers the fairness concern,the influence of fair concern on the optimal decision of each channel member under decentralized decision is analyzed.The results show that in the manufacturer led dual channel E-CLSC,the manufacturer considers the fairness concern.With the increase of the degree of fairness concern,the sales price of the network platform increases and the commission decreases,which leads to the decrease of the recovery rate,the increase of retail price and the increase of wholesale price,which leads to the decrease of retailer's profit,the decrease of network platform's profit,the increase of manufacturer's profit,and the whole supply chain system the profit is reduced,so there are fairness concerns in the supply chain,which is not conducive to the coordinated development of the supply chain.Therefore,the coordination of supply chain system can be realized through a new revenue sharing contract suitable for three parties.Finally,an example is given for analysis.