摘要
文章在EPR约束下探究动力电池供应链承担延伸责任的主体,以及考虑企业社会责任行为和梯度利用的回收策略问题。构建了由单一电池商、汽车品牌商、梯度利用企业以及消费者组成的动力电池供应链,在电池商和汽车品牌商分别承担延伸责任下利用Stackelberg博弈理论分析了电池商、电池商和梯度利用企业、汽车品牌商、汽车品牌商和梯度利用企业四种情形下CSR努力的回收策略,最后利用MATLAB对数值算例进行仿真。结果表明:CSR努力成本会被供应链成员通过正向供应链(提高批发价格和零售价格)转移给消费者承担;梯度利用可以增加批发和零售价格以及供应链成员CSR水平及系统利润;当价格敏感度和研发成本都很高,电池商CSR努力下的系统利润较优;当价格敏感度和研发成本都很低,汽车品牌商和梯度利用企业参与CSR努力的系统利润最高。
Under the constraints of EPR,this article explores the main body of power battery supply chain that assumes extended responsibilities,and considers corporate social responsibility behavior and recycling strategies of gradient utilization.Constructing a Stackelberg game model composed of a single battery producer,a single car manufacturer,a single gradient utilization enterprise,and consumers.Under the extended responsibilities of battery producer and car manufacturer,respectively,the Stackelberg game theory was used to analyze the recycling strategies of CSR efforts in four scenarios:battery producer,battery producer and gradient utilization enterprise,car manufacturer,car manufacturer and gradient utilization enterprise,finally,we use MATLAB to simulate the numerical example.The result shows:CSR investment costs will be transferred to consumers through the forward supply chain(increasing wholesale prices and retail prices);gradient utilization can increase wholesale and retail prices,as well as the CSR level of supply chain members and system profits;when price sensitivity and R&D costs are high,the battery producer makes CSR investment can help system obtain optimal profits;when the price sensitivity and R&D costs are low,the system profits under the car manufacturer and the gradient utilization enterprise's participation is optimal.
作者
黄铭煌
马汉武
HUANG Minghuang;MA Hanwu(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)
出处
《物流科技》
2021年第1期144-149,共6页
Logistics Sci-Tech