高管非财务业绩评价指标应用研究:影响因素与信息有效性

On Non-Financial Performance Measurements for Top Management:Determinants and Information Relevance

基于手工整理的2007〜2018年度上市公司高管薪酬考核方案数据,本文发现企业会计信息质量越低以及高管持股比例越小时,越倾向使用非财务业绩考核指标进行高管考核。进一步,本文从高管薪酬-业绩敏感性维度考察非财务业绩指标的信息有效性,研究发现非财务业绩指标能降低高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性。从具体的非财务业绩指标来看,会计信息质量越低的企业使用“安全生产”类指标的程度越高;高管持股越低的企业使用“员工”“研发”类指标的程度越高。此外,仅“员工”类指标能够降低高管薪酬-业绩敏感性。上述结果表明非财务业绩评价指标能够为董事会提供有用信息,进而降低高管薪酬激励中对于财务指标的依赖性。

Based on the manually-collected data about the executive compensation evaluation scheme of listed companies,this study finds that the worse quality of accounting information or the fewer shares held by the top management,the more likely a firm use non-financial performance measurements.Furthermore,we examine the usefulness of the non-financial performance measurements by investigating its impact on executive incentive plans,and the pay-performance sensitivity.We discover that non-financial performance measurements reduce the extent to which firms use equity incentives to motivate executives,and they also reduce the pay-performance sensitivity.In terms of specific non-financial performance measures,firms with lower accounting information quality are more likely to adopt the measurement of“safety production”;firms whose top management hold fewer shares are more likely to adopt the measurements related to“employee”,or“R&D”.Last,only the measurement of“employee”can reduce the pay-performance sensitivity for the top management.In sum,our study shows that non-financial performance measurements can effectively provide useful information for the board of directors about top management,while reducing the reliance of financial measurements in top management evaluation.