摘要
随着逆全球化抬头,国家安全贸易壁垒日渐增多,甚至成为发达霸权国家打压新兴发展中国家的工具。政治利益是推动国家安全贸易壁垒的重要因素,政治性是国家安全贸易壁垒的重要特性;在当前时代背景,发达霸权国家设置国家安全贸易壁垒有一定的必然性。本文从新兴发展中国家崛起,发达霸权国家日渐衰退这一时代背景出发,构建动态博弈模型,得出新兴发展中国家通过必要的反制可以达到动态博弈纳什均衡的结论;提出了"容忍产量比"的概念,产量比超出容忍产量比越多,壁垒发生的概率越高,强度越大;建议我国要准确把握国家安全贸易壁垒政治特性,支持战略性新兴产业核心产业链国产化;尽快建立"不可靠实体清单"制度。
With the rise of anti globalization,national security trade barriers are increasing,and even become a tool for developed hegemonic countries to suppress emerging developing countries.This paper holds that:political interest is an important factor to promote national security trade barriers,and political nature is an important feature of national security trade barriers;in the current era,it is inevitable for developed hegemonic countries to set up national security trade barriers.Based on the background that emerging developing countries are rising and developed hegemonic countries are declining day by day,this paper constructs a dynamic game model,draws the conclusion that emerging developing countries can achieve dynamic game Nash equilibrium through necessary countermeasures,and puts forward the concept of"tolerance output ratio".The more output ratio exceeds the tolerance yield ratio,the higher the probability of barriers and the greater the intensity It is suggested that China should accurately grasp the political characteristics of national security trade barriers,support the localization of the core industry chain of strategic emerging industries,and establish the"list of unreliable entities"system as soon as possible.
作者
刘树新
Liu Shuxin(People’s Bank of China,Meizhou Branch,Meizhou 514021,China)
出处
《福建金融管理干部学院学报》
2020年第4期21-31,共11页
Journal of Fujian Institute of Financial Administrators
关键词
国际贸易
贸易壁垒
国家安全贸易壁垒
动态博弈
International Trade
Trade Barriers
National Security Trade Barriers
Dynamic Game