分析师羊群行为与企业风险承担

Analyst Herding Behavior and Corporate Risk-Taking

本文利用中国沪深两市A股上市公司数据,实证检验了证券分析师羊群行为与企业风险承担的关系,研究发现:分析师羊群行为会削弱企业风险承担。进一步研究表明,加剧信息不对称是分析师羊群行为降低企业风险承担的重要机制。并且,当企业融资约束较高、公司治理较弱时,分析师羊群行为与企业风险承担的负向关系更显著。此外,分析师羊群行为抑制企业风险承担的具体表现形式体现在降低企业创新和债务融资上。本文丰富了企业风险承担影响因素及分析师羊群行为经济后果的文献,有助于深入了解分析师在企业风险选择中发挥的作用。

Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed firms,this paper empirically studies the impact of security analysts’herding behavior on corporate risk-taking.The results show that analyst herding Behavior weakens corporate risk-taking.Further research shows that increasing information asymmetry is an important mechanism for analyst herding behavior to reduce corporate risk-taking.Meanwhile,the negative relation between analyst herding behavior and corporate risk-taking is more prominent in firms with severe financial constraints and weak corporate governance.In addition,analyst herding behavior restrains corporate risk-taking through the channels of reducing corporate innovation and debt financing.This paper enriches the literature on the influence factors of corporate risk-taking and on the economic consequences of analyst herding behavior,which is helpful to understand the role of analysts played in enterprise risk selection.