CFO兼任董事能抑制企业极端避税行为吗?

Does CFO Serving as a Director Restrain Corporate Extreme Tax Avoidance?

本文从理论上分析了CFO兼任董事对企业极端激进和极端保守避税行为的影响,并以2009~2017年A股上市公司为研究样本,采用分位数回归进行实证检验。研究结果表明:当企业避税极端保守时,CFO兼任董事能够显著提高企业避税程度;当企业避税极端激进时,CFO兼任董事并没有显著降低企业避税程度。进一步检验外部治理和内部治理对两者关系的影响发现:当企业纳税信用评级较高时,CFO兼任董事同时抑制了企业极端激进和极端保守的避税行为;当地区税收征管力度较强时,CFO兼任董事能够显著地抑制企业极端激进避税行为;当股权集中度较高时,CFO兼任董事同时对企业极端激进和极端保守避税行为发挥了治理作用。本文的研究表明,CFO兼任董事能够对企业极端避税行为发挥财务咨询和监督作用,一定的内外部治理机制的加强能够促进CFO兼任董事治理作用的发挥。

This paper analyzes the impact of the CFO’s directorship on extremely aggressive and conservative tax avoidance using the quantile regression based on the sample of A-share listed firms from 2009 to 2017.The study finds that when the tax avoidance is extremely conservative,CFO serving as a director raises the tax avoidance;when the tax avoidance is extremely aggressive,CFO serving as a director reduces the tax avoidance.Further study finds that CFO serving as a director restrains extremely aggressive and conservative tax avoidance at the same time when the tax-playing credit rating is higher and the ownership concentration degree is higher.CFO’s directorship has a significant governance effect on extremely aggressive tax avoidance,and this effect is more pronounced in stronger supervision area.The study shows that CFO serving as a director can play the role of financial consultation and supervision to extreme tax avoidance,and the strengthening of internal and external governance mechanism can strengthen the governance effect of CFO’s directorship.