1969年中苏冲突对尼克松政府对华政策的影响

An Analysis of the Nixon Administration’s Cognition towards PRC in 1969

1969年3月及8月,中苏相继爆发珍宝岛及铁列克提武装冲突,在此期间,尼克松政府日益改变对华认知,逐渐对华施行“接触”政策。珍宝岛冲突后,美国注意到中国释放的对外战略温和信号,但就冲突保持中立;铁列克提冲突后,尼克松政府加速认识到苏联对华的强烈报复心态和实质威胁性,体认到中国在战略三角中的关键地位,中国安全与否事关冷战全局。经珍宝岛冲突所触发,以及铁列克提冲突所定型,在美国改变对华认知以及制定对华新战略的半年多历程中,现实主义的均势外交思想占据了主导。为避免苏联扶立新的中国亲苏政权、获得麦金德式的欧亚大陆霸权,尼克松政府将中国的生存和安全视作美国国家核心利益的革命性认知变化,在战略理念层面指导了美国联合中国制衡苏联的大战略转型,这助推了20世纪70年代美苏“缓和”的达成,催化了同期中美安全关系及防务合作的隐秘发展。

From March to August of 1969,furious armed conflicts broke out between the PRC and the USSR onZhenbao Island and Tielieketi.During the con⁃flicts,the US government gradually changed its China perceptions and gradually adopted the Engagement Policy towards the PRC.After the conflict of Zhenbao Island,the Nixon administration noticed the moderate postures of Chinese for⁃eign policy,but the US still indicated a neutral attitudes towards the Sino-Soviet border conflicts.Yet after the conflict of Tielieketi,the Nixon administration realized the strong retaliatory attitudes of the USSR towards the PRC.In this case,US figured out the importance of China in the Strategic Triangle.From the conflict of Zhenbao Island to the conflict of Tielieketi,the realist thinking of"balance of power"occupied a dominant position in US decision making.In order to avoid USSR launching a nuclear strike towards PRC and USSR gaining the hegemony of Eurasia,the Nixon administration took the security of PRC as relevant to the core interests of US national security.This revolutionary cogni⁃tion helped the process of uniting the PRC to counterbalance the USSR and it also helped forming the Detente between US and USSR during the 1970s.