摘要
"吹哨人"即知情举报人.当前对影子银行的监管,主要以政府监管为主.但在政府与影子银行的监管博弈中,博弈双方总会陷入"加强监管→不违规→放松监管→违规→加强监管…"的怪圈,从本质上说,这是一种制度不完全性.而吹哨人的引入,可以打破怪圈,提升政府监管水平.文章在吹哨人视角下,构建了动态博弈和演化博弈的理论模型,研究了影子银行的监管问题.然后,通过MATALAB仿真模拟,研究了吹哨人参与下,政府与影子银行的博弈,并得出结论:吹哨人可提高政府监管效率,迫使影子银行不违规,但一味依赖吹哨人,也会造成政府监管放松,因此,政府监管应和吹哨人制度相结合.
Whistleblowers refer to insiders.The current supervision of shadow banking is mainly relied on government.However,in the regulatory game between the government and the shadow bank,the two sides of the game will always fall into the strange circle of"strengthening supervision→not violating regulations→relaxing supervision→violating regulations→strengthening supervision…".In essence,it reflects the incompleteness of the system.The introduction of whistleblowers can break the cycle and raise the level of government supervision.From the perspective of social supervision,the article constructs a theoretical model of dynamic and evolutionary game and studies the supervision of shadow banking.Then,through the simulation of MATALAB,the game between government and shadow banking is studied under the background of whistleblowers,and it is concluded that whistleblowers can improve the efficiency of government regulation and force shadow banking not to violate regulations,but they will also cause government regulation relaxed.Therefore,whistleblowers system and government supervision should be merged.
作者
沈敏奇
黄侃梅
SHEN Min-qi;HUANG Kan-mei(Shanghai Zhongqiao College Economics and Management College,Shanghai 201514,China)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
北大核心
2020年第23期295-306,共12页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
关键词
影子银行
政府
吹哨人
演化博弈
动态博弈
监管
shadow banking
government
whistleblowers
evolutionary game
dynamic game
supervision