市场冲击、企业负债水平与“去杠杆”的政策选择

Market Shocks,Debt Level and Policy Choice of Deleveraging

为了探索出如何在保证企业正常发展的前提下,有效推进结构性供给侧改革,针对不同市场景气状态的企业精准“去杠杆”,本文在理论分析的基础上,利用A股制造业上市公司财务数据分析发现,企业负债水平与市场景气状态之间呈现出与主流资本结构理论不同的“U型”关系。进一步构建反映总量和增量负债水平双方程,实证分析市场冲击对企业负债水平的作用机制,结果发现,在市场高扩张期,需求冲击与整体和净新增负债水平正相关,说明需求的上升会激励企业主动扩大债务规模;而收缩期需求和价格冲击与整体负债水平负相关,与净新增负债水平不相关,说明需求和价格的下跌无法有效引导债务“退出”,反而会导致负债水平因清偿困难而被动增加。因此,“去杠杆”政策应针对不同市场景气状态的企业精准施策,避免由于对债务融资的过度扼制给企业造成损失。

In order to explore how to effectively promote the structural supply-side reform on the premise of ensuring the development of companies and how to accurately“deleverage”according to companies’different market states,this study builds both theoretical and empirical framework by using A-share manufacturing listed companies’financial data,and it finds that different from the current mainstream capital structure theory,there is a“U-shaped”relationship between debt levels and market states.We construct both total and net incremental debt level models to analyze the impact of market shocks on companies debt financing decisions.The empirical results indicate that,under the highly expanding state,demand and price shocks are positively correlated with the overall and net new debt levels,the rising of demand and price encourages companies to increase their debt levels actively.In a contraction,demand and price shocks are negatively correlated with the overall debt levels,but not associated with the net new debt levels,the decline of demand and price cannot effectively induce companies to pay off their debts,which leads to the passive increase of debt levels.Therefore,the“deleveraging”policy should be implemented precisely according to different market states so that companies under the highly expanding state can avoid the losses caused by excessive restraint on investment activities and debt financing.