环境规制、市场势力与企业创新

Environmental Regulation,Market Power and Enterprise Innovation

具有市场势力的企业面临环境规制时可以通过研发创新实现波特效应,也可以通过转嫁合规成本实现利润最大化。本文利用新《环境保护法》实施这一准自然实验,基于双重差分和三重差分模型系统地评估了环境强监管对具有不同市场势力的上市公司研发创新的影响。研究发现,新《环境保护法》的实施显著促进了企业的研发创新,市场势力本身与企业创新呈现倒“U”型关系,同时市场势力显著抑制了新《环境保护法》的波特效应。

When enterprises with monopoly power are facing environmental regulation,they can realize the Porter effect through innovation,or maximize profits by transferring compliance costs.Based on the data of listed companies,double difference model and triple difference model,this paper systematically evaluates the impact of strong environmental supervision on R&D innovation of listed companies with different market forces by using the quasi natural experiment implemented by the new environmental protection law.The empirical study finds that,firstly,the implementation of the new environmental protection law significantly promotes the R&D innovation of enterprises;secondly,market power and enterprise innovation present an inverted"U";Finally,market forces significantly inhibit the porter effect of the new environmental protection law.