竞争–竞争市场结构下的互补产品捆绑策略

Bundling strategy of complementary products under competitive-competitive market structure

在竞争–竞争的市场背景下,考虑在位企业和潜在竞争者(新进入企业)都可以独立提供一组完全互补的优势产品和普通产品,以及决定是否采取捆绑销售以提高产品销量、维持市场优势地位.通过Stackelberg博弈,分别针对双方均捆绑、在位企业捆绑、潜在竞争者捆绑和双方均不捆绑四种情形,研究在位企业和潜在竞争者的市场策略、(占优)产品策略和最优价格决策,并分析相应策略下的供应链绩效.结果表明,捆绑策略是否占优,主要取决于优势产品的成本高低,以及优势产品和普通产品的相对价值差距;如果优势产品的成本偏高、产品相对价值差距较小,捆绑策略会被在位企业视为阻挡潜在竞争者进入市场的手段;在绝大多数情况下,采用互补产品捆绑策略都是有益的.

This paper studies whether to sell two products in a bundle when both an incumbent company and a potential competitor(i.e.,the new entrant)can produce a competitive product and a general one,in a competitive-competitive market.Using the Stackelberg game in four scenarios combined by bundling and nonbundling strategies,this paper investigates the dominant strategy and the optimal price decisions,and analyzes the supply chain performance.The results show that the bundling strategy is determined by the cost of the competitive product and the relative value differential between the two products;if the cost of the competitive product is high and the relative value differential is small,bundling will be used by the incumbent as a means of preventing the potential competitor from entering the market.Moreover,it is found that the bundling strategy of complementary products is beneficial in most cases.