第三方部分担保下的供应链应收账款融资模型

Supply Chain Accounts Receivable Financing Model under the Partial Guarantee of Third-party

针对由一个处于核心企业地位的零售商和一个资金受限的制造商组成的两级供应链,基于斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型,在零售商存在违约风险背景下,分析第三方部分担保对供应链应收账款融资决策的影响。研究表明,制造商承担担保费用可以降低金融机构提供融资的利率,提高金融机构的支付对价;零售商承担担保费用可以削弱供应链融资和运营中的双重边际效应,促进供应链的协调;当在供应链应收账款融资中考虑引入第三方担保公司进行担保时,最优决策是零售商承担担保费用。最后通过数值分析和案例分析验证结论。

With respect to a two-echelon supply chain comprised of a core retailer and a capital-constrained manufacturer,this paper analyzes the effect of third-party partial guarantee to the accounts receivable financingwith the consideration of retailer’s default risk.The results show that the financing interest rate decreases and the loan ratio i increases when the manufacturer pays the guarantee cost.The retailer paying the guarantee cost can reduce the double marginalization, and then improve supply chain and financing efficiency.This study shows that retailers should pay the guarantee cost when there exists third-party support partial guarantee in the accounts receivable financing.Finally,this paper conducts some numerical experiments and case study toverify results.