摘要
针对时尚服装的时尚性随时间变化的特点,考虑增加创新设计投资对服装时尚度的影响以及价格与时尚度二者对服装需求的影响,将服装时尚度作为状态变量,借助微分博弈研究由单个服装品牌商和服装供应商组成的原始设计制造供应链协调问题。研究表明:集中式决策情形下的创新设计努力、服装时尚度和渠道总利润均大于分散决策情形,但两种渠道结构下的最优定价策略取决于创新设计效率;二部收费制契约能够很好地协调供应链,创新设计效率对均衡结果产生积极影响,契约的协调能力会随着创新设计效率的增加而变强。
In view of the circumstances that fashion characteristics of clothing varies over time,this paper discussed the impact of increasing investment in innovative design on the fashion level of clothing,and the impact of both price and fashion level on the demand for clothing.The fashion level of clothing was taken as a state variable,and a differential game was used to study from the coordination problem of original design manufacturing supply chain,which was composed of single apparel brand and single apparel supplier.The research shows that the innovative design effort,the fashion level of clothing,and total channel profit in the case of centralized decision-making are larger than in the case of decentralized decision-making,but the optimal pricing strategy under the two channel structures depends on the efficiency of innovative design.The two-part tariff can well coordinate the innovation supply chain.The efficiency of innovation design has a positive impact on the equilibrium results.The coordination ability of the contract will become stronger as the efficiency of innovation design increases.
作者
周莉莉
徐琪
ZHOU Lili;XU Qi(Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)
出处
《东华大学学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
北大核心
2020年第6期975-984,1013,共11页
Journal of Donghua University(Natural Science)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572033)
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71832001)。
关键词
服装
时尚度
原始设计制造供应链
产品创新
定价
微分博弈
二部收费制契约
clothing
fashion level
original design manufacturing supply chain
product innovation
pricing
differential game
two-part tariff