信息不对称下的供应商创新激励机制研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Supplier Innovation Investment Under Information Asymmetry

本文从委托代理的角度探究了制造商对供应商质量创新的激励机制设计,分析了信息不对称以及供应商的公平偏好对激励机制的影响。结果表明,信息对称时两部定价合同能够实现供应链协调以及最优的创新水平;而当信息不对称时,制造商需要用较高的批发价激励供应商的质量创新投入。随着信息不对称的加剧,创新投入水平将不断降低,尤其是在需求对质量很敏感时。如果供应商存在公平偏好,制造商为了保障供应商的创新水平会不得不提高激励水平。

Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper focuses on the incentive mechanism for the manufacturer to induce more innovation investment of the supplier under asymmetric information.The results show that two-part tariff contract can achieve supply chain coordination and optimal innovation investment under symmetrical information.Under asymmetrical information,the manufacturer need to use higher wholesale price to encourage the supplier to invest in quality innovation.The aggravation of information asymmetry will cause the continuous reduction of quality innovation investment,especially when the demand is very sensitive to quality.If supplier’s fair preference is considered,the manufacturer must increase the level of incentives in order to ensure innovation level.