后补贴时代复合牵引机制下新能源汽车上下游企业合作创新博弈分析

Game Analysis of Cooperative Innovation for the Upstream and Downstream Enterprises of New Energy Vehicles Under the Compound Traction Mechanism in Subsidies Recession Era

针对新能源汽车上下游企业合作创新稳定性问题,构建了以整车企业与电池企业为主体的演化博弈模型,分析了积分交易价格,以及它与研发补贴、税收优惠的搭配对博弈主体行为的影响。依据案例的仿真分析发现:双积分政策引导的市场牵引机制下,积分交易价格需足够高才能有效牵引上下游企业合作创新,而目前积分标准和交易价格较低,单纯的双积分政策难以发挥牵引作用,由于研发补贴和税收优惠均存在一定的阈值,应施加较高的研发补贴和适度的税收优惠搭配才能彰显多政策配合的优势;即便在积分交易价格较高时,多种政策配合的复合机制比双积分政策引导的市场机制的牵引效果更强,且研发补贴在复合牵引机制中仍居主导性。

Aiming at the stability of cooperation and innovation among upstream and downstream enterprises, an evolutionary game model with vehicle companies and battery companies as the main body was constructed, and the impact of the integral transaction price and its combination with R&D subsidies and tax incentives on the behavior of game players was analyzed. The simulation analysis based on the case found that under the market traction mechanism guided by double integral policy, the integral transaction price needs to be high enough to effectively drive the cooperation and innovation of upstream and downstream enterprises, but the current integral standard and transaction price are low, and the simple double integral policy is difficult to exert traction.Because of there are certain thresholds for R&D subsidies and tax incentives, higher R&D subsidies and moderate tax incentives should be applied to highlight the advantages of multiple policy coordination. Even when the integral transaction price is high, the compound mechanism with multiple policies is more effective than the market traction mechanism guided by double integral policy, and R&D subsidies still dominate in the compound traction mechanism.