非控股股东对行权企业风险承担的行权效应、影响边界与传导路径

The Effect,Boundary and Transmission Path of Non-controlling Shareholders’ Exercise on Corporate Risk-taking

本文基于沪深市场上市公司数据,检验非控股股东行权对企业风险承担的行权效应、影响边界和传导路径。研究结果显示,非控股股东积极行权降低了企业风险承担水平,行权效应显著,尤其是对于行权成本与行权收益相对接近的企业而言,其行权效应更为明显。在影响边界方面,对民营、高管纵向兼任、低声誉会计师事务所审计的企业,非控股股东行权对企业风险承担的行权效应更强。进一步的研究表明,可能的作用传导路径主要是非控股股东行权通过抑制第二类代理成本减少了控股股东掏空侵占。

Based on the data of China’s listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges,this paper empirically tests the effect,the influence boundary and the transmission path of non-controlling shareholders’exercise on corporate risk-taking.The results show that the active exercise of non-controlling shareholders reduces the level of enterprise risk-taking,and the exercise effect is significant.Moreover,in the enterprises whose exercise costs are relatively close to the exercise income,the exercise effect is more obvious.On the boundary of influence,for private-owned companies,companies with vertical managers and companies audited by low-reputation accounting firms,the exercise of non-controlling shareholders has a significant effect on corporate risk-taking.Further,the possible transmission path is mainly through restraining the second type of agency costs and reducing the controlling shareholder’s tunneling.