环境分权体制下中央政府与地方政府协同环境治理研究

Research on Environmental Governance by Central Government and Local Government Under the Environment Decentralization System

考虑到信息不对称、地区环境偏好差异以及中央政府资源的有限性,中央政府介入地方环境治理是否能最大化改善企业环境绩效取决于地方环境治理的力度。微观经济理论模型表明:地方环境治理力度存在门槛值,当治理力度低于或等于门槛值时,中央政府参与地方环境治理能够增加企业边际减排成本进而改善企业环境绩效;而当地方环境治理力度超过门槛值时,中央政府应该完全放权给地方政府,地方政府自身的有效治理能有效地改善企业环境绩效。进一步利用微观企业数据进行实证检验发现,单独的中央与地方政府环境治理均能有效地促进企业环境绩效,但两者交互项的系数显著为负,这一实证结果在污染企业与国有企业样本中也很稳健。门槛模型回归结果表明,地方环境治理力度的单一门槛值使得中央监管对企业环境绩效的作用不同,建议依据地方环境治理力度水平来实施地区差异化的环境治理策略。

Considering the information asymmetry,regional environmental preferences and the limited resources of the central government,whether the central government’s intervention in local environmental governance can maximize the corporate environmental performance(CEP)depends on local environ-mental enforcement.The microeconomic theoretical model shows that there is a threshold value for local environmental enforcement.When the local environmental enforcement is lower than or equal to the threshold value,the cooperation of both the central and the local government can increase the marginal abatement cost.However,once the local environmental enforcement exceeds the threshold value,the effect of central supervision on the marginal abatement cost decreases along with the increase of local environmental enforcement.Furthermore,by using the firm-level data to test the theoretical model,the empirical results show that both central supervision and local enforcement can separately effectively promote the CEP,while the coefficient of the interaction coefficient is significantly negative.These empirical results are also robust in the samples of polluting firms and state-owned firms.The threshold model shows that there is a single threshold value of local enforcement,which makes the performance of central supervision on corporate environmental performance different.Therefore,the regional differentiated environmental management strategy should be implemented according to the level of environmental supervision.