公司治理视角下高管薪酬对资本结构动态调整的影响研究

Research on the impact of executive compensation on the dynamic adjustment of capital structure from the perspective of corporate governance

基于动态权衡理论、代理理论和最优契约理论,以我国2009—2017年A股上市公司为样本,运用标准部分调整模型,通过SYS-GMM方法检验了高管薪酬与资本结构调整速度之间的关系,以及公司治理水平和产权性质不同时,高管薪酬与资本结构调整速度关系的差异。研究发现,总体来说高管薪酬越高,资本结构调整速度越快,此结果仅在民营企业中显著;股权集中度越高、经理不兼任董事长以及董事会中独董占比越高,高管薪酬的激励作用越好,降低代理成本的效果越明显,资本结构调整的速度越快。这说明完善公司治理机制能够有效提高高管薪酬对促进资本结构调整速度的激励效果,特别是国有企业应加强对高管的监管,加快企业资本结构优化。

Based on the dynamic tradeoff theory,agency theory and the optimal contract theory,taking 2009-2017 a-share listed companies in our country as samples,using the standard partial adjustment model,the relationship between executive compensation and capital structure adjustment speed,as well as the difference in that relationship due to different levels of corporate governance and the nature of property rights are tested through the SYS-GMM method.The study found that,on the whole,the higher the executive compensation,the faster the capital structure adjustment,which was only significant in private enterprises.The higher the degree of ownership concentration,the higher the proportion of non-chairman managers and the independent directors in the board of directors,the better the incentive effect of executive compensation,the more obvious the effect of reducing agency costs,and the faster the capital structure adjustment.This shows that the improvement of corporate governance mechanism can effectively improve the incentive effect of executive compensation to promote the speed of capital structure adjustment.In particular,state-owned enterprises should strengthen the supervision of senior executives and accelerate the optimization of enterprise capital structure.