税收竞争、资本用脚投票与产业转型升级

Tax Competition,Capital Movement and Industrial Transformation and Upgrading

政府竞争能否像市场竞争一样改进经济效率?这一问题在“强政府”主导经济下的中国尤其重要。本文实证发现,在区内资本相对劳动配置过度时,中国地方政府的税收竞争行为扭曲了空间资本配置,进而阻滞了分别以附加值和技术进步两大质量指标标示的产业转型升级进程;反之,当区内资本相对劳动配置不足时,地方税收竞争则优化了空间资本配置,进而促进本地经济的提质增效。税收竞争并未通过挤压支出竞争而施加影响于产业转型升级,因为地方财政不存在严格的“以收定支”硬预算约束。在将政府竞争策略从税收竞争扩围至包含税收、土地和社保政策的减税降费竞争之后,上述影响机制依然成立。进一步地,地方税收竞争的效率冲击更多体现在企业所得税竞争而非增值税竞争。以上结论对地方税收竞争策略、中央差异化管制和经济高质量增长均有重要启示。

Does government competition improve economic efficiency as much as market competition?This is an important question especially in a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.The empirical research shows that local tax competition(LTC)may reduce the efficiency of capital allocation and block industrial transformation and upgrading(ITU)while over-investment exists.This effect is the opposite if under-investment exists.LTC doesn't affect ITU significantly by repressing local expenditure competition because of the soft budget constraints.The above effects remain the same when local preferential policies involve tax,land price and social insurance.The impact of enterprise income tax competition is more significant than that of VAT competition.This study holds great practical significance for implementing or regulating LTC and improving the quality of economic development.