合乎事实之“真”与合乎逻辑之“明”——析维特根斯坦《逻辑哲学论》的悖论

Differentiation between the“Truth”in Accordance with Facts and the“Clarity”in Accordance with Logic:An Inner Paradox in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》里首先严格界定了“合乎事实”之“真”,但在认知理性精神异化悖论的影响下,接下来却以混淆概念的方式把“合乎逻辑”之“明”说成是一种更重要的“真”,结果在两者关系的问题上造成了一系列自相矛盾。其实,合乎事实之“真”才是认知行为的主导目的,合乎逻辑之“明”则是有助于实现这个目的的有效工具。只有深入辨析二者之间的鲜明反差、交织缠绕和主次地位,我们才能克服认知理性精神的异化裂变,解答包括“科学何以成为科学”“逻辑学能否成为一门科学”等在内的众多理论难题。

In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,Wittgenstein first defines the“truth”of propositions as“in accordance with the fact”.Under the deep influence of the aliened paradox of cognitive-rational spirit,however,he then regards the“clarity”of propositions“in accordance with logic”as a more important“truth”by confusing these two key concepts,and thus falls into some logical contradictions in this issue.In fact,the“truth”in accordance with the facts is the dominant purpose of cognitive action,and the“clarity”in accordance with logic is an effective tool to achieve this goal.Only by analyzing the sharp contrast,interweaving relationship,and relative status between them,can we overcome the aliened fission of cognitive-rational spirit and answer such important problems as“how science becomes science”and“can logic become a science”.