可再生能源配额考核监管与主体行为策略选择

Assessment and supervision of renewable portfolio standards and strategic selection of stakeholders

为支持可再生能源行业的健康发展和实现低碳环保效益,在权衡社会多方的复杂利益后,中国正式推行了可再生能源电力配额政策,而加强政策执行和考核监管力度是实行配额制的重要保障。本文运用演化博弈理论分析了中央政府、地方政府与电网企业关于可再生能源配额指标完成情况的考核监管问题,讨论了不同情景下主体行为的策略选择。结果表明:(1)在考虑惩罚约束的情景下,增加惩罚力度能够促使电网企业完成可再生能源总量和非水电配额的双项指标任务。但如果地方政府缺少激励,也会放松监管力度。(2)在实现超额配额的激励情景下,激励性指标设定在10%~30%之间,中央政府对地方政府采取严格监管策略的激励作用较弱。但在33%~47%之间时,可起到显著的激励作用。(3)在两种过渡情景的数值模拟中,单纯地增加激励比例不是中央政府的最好选择,需要同时增加最低配额的约束比重,才能实现对地方政府的最优激励。上述研究可为中国建立和完善具有激励性的可再生能源配额考核监管制度提供理论指导和实践参考。

In order to support the healthy development of renewable energy and realize low-carbon environmental benefits,China has implemented the renewable portfolio standards policy after the coordination of multiple social interests,and strengthening the policy implementation and assessment and supervision are the guarantee for the implementation of the renewable portfolio standards.The method of evolutionary game was used to analyze the problem of quota target completion and inspection regulation among the central government,local governments,and power grid companies,and the principle of system dynamics was also used to reflect the inner game structure and its dynamic evolution mechanism of the tripartite stakeholders,whose strategic choices are discussed under different scenarios.The results show that:(1)In the scenario of punishment constraint,increasing punishment can help power grid enterprises to fulfill the dual targets of total renewable energy and non-hydropower renewable portfolio standards.But if the government lacks incentives,it will also loosen regulation.(2)Under the incentive scenario of realizing excess quota,the incentive radio is set by central government between 10%and 30%,which has a weak incentive effect on local governments to adopt a strict regulation strategy,but can have a significant incentive effect at between 33%and 47%.(3)Under the transitional scenarios,it is not the best choice for the central government to simply increase the incentive ratio.It is necessary to increase the constraint proportion of the minimum quota at the same time to realize the optimal incentive for local governments.This research may provide theoretical guidance and has practical values for the establishment and improvement of incentive assessment and supervision system of renewable portfolio standards in China.