演化博弈视角下资产评估质量监管策略

Evolutionary Game-Based Study on Regulatory Strategies for Asset Appraisal Quality

基于博弈视角分析评估主体行为,运用演化博弈理论,引入不同类型的奖惩机制,寻求评估质量监管途径。研究结果表明:在“惩罚”机制下,除非对每一笔评估交易进行审查,并且加大惩罚力度,否则评估机构会选择违规评估以获取超额收益,评估市场陷入恶意竞争环境;而给予合规评估机构激励和适度惩处可以提高评估市场的有效性,在“激励+惩罚”机制下,评估机构和委托方均愿意采取合规行为。

Based on evolutionary game theory,this paper introduces different reward and punishment mechanisms with a comparative analysis of the behavior of asset appraisal agencies.The results show that under the single"punishment"mechanism appraisal agencies will choose to obtain excess profits from illegal appraisals unless every transaction is examined and punishments for illegal appraisals get more severe,which puts the appraisal market in a hostile competitive environment;however,a combination of incentives and appropriate punishments helps improve the effectiveness of the market.Under the"incentive plus punishment"mechanism,both appraisal agencies and entrusting clients are willing to behave in compliance with the regulations.