论认罪协商程序中被追诉人非理性选择的制度控制

On Institutional Control of Irrational Choices of the Accused in Plea Negotiation Procedure

认罪协商程序也存在错误追诉,其中值得关注的是无辜被追诉人基于认识和判断错误“主动自愿”认罪以及“权力主导模式”下的“屈从自愿”认罪,以“被追诉人非理性选择”对该现象进行概括、分析可以带来新的认识和启发。控辩地位的天然不平等、检察机关考核机制、被追诉人信息不对称且盲目乐观等因素极大地推动了被追诉人非理性选择的形成。解决这一问题,需综合多种举措,如推动检察机关考核机制改革,完善既有提高被追诉人的信息与谈判能力的配套制度,还可以考虑尝试进行创新举措改革,如结合被追诉人信息能力不足与乐观偏见状况设计一种更为有效、精确的信息提示机制。

There are also erroneous prosecutions in the plea negotiation procedure,in which it is worth paying attention to the fact that the innocent accused pleaded guilty“voluntarily”based on wrong understanding and judgment and“subservient voluntary”under the“power-dominated mode”.The generalization and analysis of this phenomenon with“irrational choice of the accused”can bring new understanding and inspiration.The natural inequality of prosecution and defense status,the assessment mechanism of procuratorial organs,the information asymmetry and blind optimism of the accused have greatly promoted the formation of the irrational choice of the accused.To solve this problem,we need to integrate a variety of measures,such as promoting the reform of the assessment mechanism of procuratorial organs,perfecting the existing supporting system to improve the information and negotiation ability of the accused and we can also consider trying to carry out innovative measures reform.For example,some effective and accurate information prompt mechanism can be used to get rid of the defects of information asymmetry and optimistic bias of the accused.